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Although Nigeria, like most developing countries is facing various security challenges,  recent media reports suggest that 
activities of Boko Haram insurgent group appears to be the most visible source of security threat to the country. Beginning 
2009, the group launched violent attack on the Nigerian state, killing thousands of people and destroying public and private 
properties in different parts of the country. Globally, the group is now labeled as one of the most deadly insurgent/terrorist 
groups in the world.  Like most insurgent or terrorist groups, it seems to defy several counter terrorism measures introduced by 
the Nigerian government. Arising from this background, many Nigerians are calling for the involvement of traditional institutions 
in the fight against the insurgent or terrorist groups. This article attempts to examine the role which African traditional 
institutions can play in managing the menace of such groups. Methodologically, in-depth interview was adopted for the study 
using Kano Emirate Council as case study. Thus, among the findings of the study is that traditional institutions occupy a 
strategic position in Nigerian setting which make them relevant in the fight against insurgents. In this article we argue that 
considering the closeness of the institutions to the communities, lack of modern security monitoring equipment and 
comprehensive data on the population for security agencies to keep abreast with the happenings in the society, the Nigerian 
government should create a framework to synergize between the institutions and the contemporary security agencies. 
 




Global media reports indicate that Nigeria is presently embroil in serious security challenges particularly those arising 
from the activities of Boko Haram1 insurgent group. The group which came to public limelight in 2009 has over the period 
terrorized the country’s entire Northern region including the centrally located Federal Capital Territory Abuja. The only 
place which the group has not attacked for now is the Southern and Eastern parts of Nigeria comprising states such as 
Lagos, Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Anambra, Imo, and other states. Apart from destruction of public and private properties worth 
millions of naira, killing thousands of people, the group has also resorted to kidnapping mass number of people (women, 
school girls, young boys, men) in several communities of the affected states.  
Among the most prominent attacks undertaken by Boko Haram is the abduction of over 200 female students of 
Government Girls Secondary School Chibok in Borno State on the night of April 14-15, 2014. The violent activities of 
Boko have affected the existing fragile social relations among Nigeria’s multi-ethnic and religious groups. Furthermore, 
the political and economic sectors are also affected since commercial banks and telecommunication installations continue 
to be attacked by the insurgents. To date the group has managed to control 16 local government territories out of the 774 
local governments in Nigeria. Thus, they have transformed themselves into a mini-state. 
Like any other insurgent group in the world, Boko Haram appears to defy all known conventional security 
measures adopted by the Nigerian government. For example, one of the first measures taken by the Nigerian authorities 
                                                                            
1 Boko Haram is a Hausa word which means the forbidden of  Western education. 
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against the group following its emergence in 2002 at Maiduguri the capital of Borno state was the use of excessive force. 
The actions of the security forces resulted in high number of casualties on the side of Boko Haram including the killing of 
their then factional leader Mohammed Ali. Furthermore, when the surviving members of the group reorganized and 
launched another attack in 2009, similar measure was employed by the government. This was the operation that resulted 
in the controversial death of the group’s leader Mohammed Yusuf in the hands of the police, having been captured alive 
by the military. To reduce the raising attacks by Boko Haram, the government also declared state of emergency in some 
states following the violent response of Boko Haram to avenge the death of their leader Mohammed Yusuf.  As the 
situation began to degenerate, the government introduced ‘Terrorism and Prevention Act (TPA) 2011’; and ‘Money 
Laundering (Prohibition) Act (MLPA) 2011’, on June 3, 2011. 
However, relevant literature suggests that instead of eliminating the group, these approaches have ended up as 
the main catalysts for transforming Boko Haram into its present status of being classified as one of the most dangerous 
terrorist group in the world, alongside with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Qaeda. Several reasons have 
been advanced for the seeming failure or ineffective use of force by the government in fighting Boko Haram insurgents.  
But the most prominent is the issue of corruption in the security sector where trillions of naira2 has been spent in the last 
6 years. For example, some military personnel involved in the fight against the insurgents were recently reported to have 
been court martial for refusing to participate in the exercise due to nonpayment of their allowances and lack of good 
weapons. Furthermore, there are allegations that some members of the security agents are playing double standard in 
the fight against the insurgent group. These unfortunate developments have resulted in the continuous dwindling of public 
trust on the contemporary security institutions saddled with the responsibilities of ensuring security of the Nigerian 
citizens.  
Thus, among the various implications of this the above scenario is the uncooperative attitudes of the public in 
giving intelligent or useful information relating to the activities of the suspected members of Boko Haram to the security 
agents. This is because a friendly relationship between security agents and the public is a key factor in fighting 
insurgencies as it helps the security agents to obtain information which can lead to nipping pending attacks by the 
insurgents in the bud. It is therefore in line with the above reasons, that some members of the security experts and the 
general public have pressed the Nigerian government to again engage traditional institutions in security management. 
The calls for reengaging traditional institutions in Nigeria’s security management are also predicated on several reasons. 
Firstly, members of traditional institutions occupy strategic positions within their various communities which make them to 
be closer to the grass root citizens. Secondly, traditional institutions have an established administrative structure within 
the various communities which can be used for intelligence gathering.  
Thirdly, the institutions as custodians of traditional norms and culture enjoy a high degree of respect and loyalty 
from members of their respective communities irrespective of one’s social status. Fourthly, conflict resolution 
mechanisms employed by traditional institutions in resolving intra and inter communal disputes and conflicts have over 
the years proven to be effective. Furthermore, there is an argument that insurgents are not spirits but human beings who 
live within the communities which can be effectively policed by members of the traditional institutions. Against the 
aforementioned background, a study on the role which traditional institutions such as Kano Emirate Council of Kano 
State, Nigeria can play in counterterrorism management becomes imperative. In addition, the paper also addresses the 




This study was conducted based on qualitative research method using two types of data (primary and secondary) 
obtained through in-depth interview and review of related publications. The in-depth interview was conducted on semi 
structure basis with purposively selected respondents from security agencies, Kano traditional Emirate Council, 
professional associations3 and the general public within the study area. Thus, while the respondents from security 
agencies were selected from the army, police, immigration, customs, civil defense corps, and state security service, those 
from Kano traditional Emirate Council were selected across the administrative hierarchy of the council (Emir or the 
Islamic ruler, district4, village5, and ward heads6). Other respondents were selected from members of the academia, 
                                                                            
2 Naira is the official name for Nigeria’s currency 
3Umbrella or body for professional people such as lawyers, Journalists, etc. 
4Divisional representative of the Emir  
5Rural representative of the emir  
6Administrative representative of the emir within the city divisions or settlements 
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general public and key professional associations comprising Nigeria Union of Journalists, Bar Association, and business 
groups (market association). On the whole, a total of 17 respondents were selected and interviewed to obtain qualitative 
data for the study. On the other hand, secondary data for the study was obtained from the review of relevant publications 
such as books, academic journals, previous studies, and documents from government/ traditional institutions to 
compliment the primary data. The choice of this methodology was due to its ability to address the objectives of the study. 
Firstly, qualitative research according to Creswell (2007:40) helps in facilitating understanding “the context or settings in 
which participants in a study address a problem or issue”. And secondly, interview method also has the advantage of 
providing an active means for interaction between two or more people leading to a negotiated, contextually based result 
(Silverman, 1993). 
 
 Security issues in Nigeria 3.
 
Following the withdrawal of military from governance in 1999, Nigeria’s security situation began to degenerate as a result 
of violent activities of oil rich Niger Delta militias in the Southern part of the country and Boko Haram insurgent group in 
the North. However, while there appears to be some relative calm in the Niger Delta region following the introduction of 
amnesty programme, on the contrary, Boko Haram insurgents have intensified its attacks on the Nigerian state in the last 
6 years. Presently the group has constituted itself into a mini state with separate territories. Available literature indicates 
that the group which derived its name ‘Boko Haram’ (western education is forbidden) from one of Nigeria’s dominant 
ethnic language Hausa operates as an Islamic religious sect.  Hence it operates under the slogan   ‘Jama’atu Ahlis 
Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal –Jihad’ which is Arabic word for “people who are committed to the propagation of the teachings 
of Prophet Mohammad (Peace and Blessing of Allah be upon him) and Jihad”. The term is specifically employed to 
describe the basic contention of the group which is that a western civilization as represented by its secular education is a 
sin and therefore forbidden to adherents of Islamic religion. Although, Boko Haram started as a peaceful religious sect, its 
attempt to establish an Islamic Sharia code through violent means transformed the group to a typical insurgent 
organization.  
O'Neil (990: 13) defines insurgency as ‘a struggle between non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the 
non-ruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) 
and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of one or more aspects of politics’. Shedding more light on the 
concept of insurgency, Gompert and Gordon (2008) contends there are different types of insurgencies but they can be 
understood by looking at their goal, tactics, size, region, duration, international significance as well as the type of regime 
which they seek to change.  Thus, philosophically while classical insurgent groups were concerned with how to expel 
invaders away from their defined territory with the ultimate aim of taking over the reign of political power, on the other 
hand contemporary insurgencies like the Boko Haram group are aimed at replacing the existing social order (Kilcullen 
2006). However, the similarities in the operational tactics of Boko Haram insurgents and other Al-Qaeda inspired terrorist 
groups, has lead to the labeling of the group as a terrorist organization.  
 




With a population of over 160 million, Nigeria geographically situated in the gulf of Guinea in West Africa is the most 
populous country in Africa and seventh in the world (UN Report, 2012). It shares borders with four other African countries 
including Benin and Cameroun Republics in the East and West, as well as with Republics of Chad and Niger in the North 
East and North West respectively. The history of the country can be traced to the amalgamation of various ancient 
kingdoms, caliphates and emirates with over 250 different ethnic languages by the British colonialist in 1914 who 
subsequently ruled the country until independence on 1st October, 1960 (Mohammed 2007). Although, the country has a 
large number of ethnic groups, the dominant ones are the Hausa/Fulani in the North, Yoruba in the south west and Igbo 
in the south east regions respectively. While majority of these ethnic nationalities practices Islam and Christianity as 
religion, others are inclined towards native religion. 
Over the years, Nigeria has been ruled by the military but since 1999 it has been under a democratic rule operating 
American model of presidential system of governance. The country has three tiers of administrative structures comprising 
federal, 36 states and 774 local governments. Despite the existence of these modern structures, recent study reveals that 
there are quite a number of unconstitutional pre-colonial traditional institutions operating besides them with significant 
supports from the population. In addition, available literature indicates that traditional institutions of governance such as 
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the Kano Emirate Council have over the years been active in facilitating peace and stability in the country despite their 
non-constitutional recognition. 
 
4.2 Kano Traditional Emirate Council 
 
The history of Kano Emirate Council is reported to be over one millennium in spite of the fact that greater part of its 
history before sixth century was based on myths as opined by Hogben and Kirk-Greene, (1966). Located in the North 
Western Nigerian commercial city of Kano, the Emirate in its current structure with an estimated population of 10 Million 
spread across the forty four local governments of Kano State, was established during the period of Habe rulers which 
was terminated by the Fulani Jihadists under the headship of Usman Danfodio in 1805 (Blench et al, 2006).  Although the 
Hausa ruling dynasty was conquered and replaced in1807 by the Fulani Jihadists, in 1903, the Fulbe rulers were also 
conquered by the British paving ways for further restructuring of the Emirate. However, prior to the 1805-1807, and 1903 
developments, Muhammadu Rumfa (1463-1499) one of the Hausa kings who ruled the kingdom  attempted to reorganize  
the administrative structure of the Emirate in the middle of fifteenth century by introducing the concept of Islamic 
constitution as preached by Shehu Maghili7  
Thus, when the Fulani Jihadists took over it was it the same constitution they adopted as the basis of maintaining 
their leadership. Consequently, the emirate was according to Blench et al 2006 was organized along the following 
structure:  
“The Emirate was divided into districts and each district was further split into villages, while each village was made 
into wards. At the apex of the system was Sarkin Kano, (the Emir) who was assisted by the Hakimai (district heads). 
Below the village heads were the ward heads who controlled the local people. These Emirate functionaries represented 
Sarkin Kano in their respective territories” (Blench 2006:33). 
It was therefore through the above structure that law and order were maintained during the pre-colonial era within 
the various communities so as to achieve internal security of the society (Tamuno 1993).  
However, during the colonial era, following the introduction of in-direct rule system by the British colonialist the 
structure of the Emirate was divided into two parts comprising security, and administration which was merged with 
finance. Composition of the division was as follows: Family Head; Ward Head; Village Head; and District Head. On the 
other hand, the security division was structured in the following manner: Emir’s personal Body Guards (Dogarai8); Native 
Authority Police; and Prisons. On the whole, security within the society was achieved through the above structures in the 
following manner:  First and foremost the district head is the closest authority to the emir as such he is regarded as the 
emir’s representative. He oversees the functions of village heads and represents the emir on functions which he cannot 
attend. By virtue of his position and location within the local government headquarters, the district head is un-
constitutionally co-opted into the local government security committee. But his first loyalty is normally given to the emir 
before any person. Thus, whatever information, he receives from the village heads or other community leaders; he 
passes it to the emir directly before informing other relevant security agencies. As for the village, he is the link between 
the ward and the district heads function as the intermediary figure by collecting and passing information from the two 
sides whenever the need arises.  Like the ward head, he is also assisted by the community leaders such as Sarkin 
pawa9, Sarkin kasuwa10, Imams11 and others. The major difference him and the ward head is that he co-ordinates the 
activities of several wards and pass them to the district head. 
Similarly, the Ward head as the closest form of traditional authority’s representative in the emirate is responsible 
for collecting information at the grassroots level as a result of his constant interactions with the community. His grassroots 
position enables him to obtain vital security information at ease and pass it to the village head or relevant security agency 
within the community as compared to contemporary security agents who are often viewed with suspicion by the majority 
of the people. The ward head is assisted in this task by other appointed community leaders who control various aspects 
of the community daily activities such as meat sellers over seen by Sarkin  pawa,  market traders also overseen by Sarkin 
kasuwa and of course the spiritual functions headed by the Imams, (Albasu 2007).  The above structure indicates that the 
Emirate is firmly rooted in the grass root population of the community which makes it easy for it to monitor the activities of 
                                                                            
7 A Middle Eastern Scholar who wrote a famous treatise on governing called “The Obligation of the Princes” to advise Emir Rumfa on the 
proper conduct of a king. 
8 Emir’s body guards were drawn from traditional slaves 
9Literally means the King of Butchers 
10Literally means the King of Market 
11Islamic Scholar appointed to lead people in congregational prayers 
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the people within its jurisdiction.  
In as much as these two structures were interwoven with the political, economic and security issues, Mohammed 
(2007) contend that they were able to function harmoniously. For instance, under the political structure (administration), 
intelligence information regarding the activities of the community members and visitors were collected by the ward head 
and passed to the emir along the hierarchical order. Every family head of the community was according to the rule 
mandated to inform the ward head about the arrival of new visitor to his house along with the visitor (s) personal bio-data 
and reason of the visit. Thus, through this mechanism, the emirates were able to track peoples’ movement thereby 
ensuring community safety. Although, the Emirate Council like any other traditional institutions in Africa has under gone 
several political changes over the years, its administrative structure has to date remained the same.  
 
 Global Perspectives on Terrorism and Insurgency Management 5.
 
As old as the history of insurgency and terrorism is so also is the history of attempts by legally constituted authorities to 
contain it. However, the expanding rate of occurrences accompanied by the use of advanced technologies in the 
beginning of 21st century has led to attempts to introduce corresponding mechanisms for managing it. Thus, introduction 
of the prefix counter to the words insurgency and terrorism by scholars as a way of indicating that something has to be 
done in an opposite direction so as to lessen the effects of these two concepts. Therefore, if insurgency as earlier defined 
is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region, 
counterinsurgency on the other hand is a comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to simultaneously defeat and 
contain insurgency and address its root cause, (US Joint Publication 3-24, 3013: 1-2).  
Similarly, if terrorism which like the concept of security still remains a subjective term is associated with “the use, or 
threat of use of violence by an individual or a group, whether acting for or in opposition to establish authority, when such 
action is designed to create extreme anxiety and, or fear including effects in a target group larger than immediate victims 
with the purpose of coercing that group into according to the political demands of the perpetrator,” (Wardlaw, 1982: 3); 
then counterterrorism which was previously defined in 2006 by the U.S. Army Field Manual (2006:4) as “operations that 
include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism”,  has now been narrowed by 
another U.S. Joint Publication on counterterrorism (2014:iii) as the “actions and activities to neutralize terrorists, their 
organizations, and networks; removes countering root causes and desired regional end States from the definition”. 
However, the two concepts do not mean the same thing. Whereas counterinsurgency is an all encompassing 
approach to countering irregular insurgent warfare which can provide a clear framework for success if the situation is ripe 
for this type of warfare, on the other hand, counterterrorism provides a less clear framework for success but is equally 
complex, (Rineheart, 2010). But interestingly, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are susceptible to change 
depending on the type of the terrorism or insurgency. This is why different countries have different approaches to 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Notwithstanding the differences employed by governments to fifth terrorism and 
insurgency, Cameroun I. Crouch (2010) in his contribution “Managing Terrorism and Insurgency: Regeneration, 
recruitment and attrition”, argues that the issue of terrorism and insurgency revolves around three issues which include 
their abilities to regenerate, undertake further recruitment of new members and how to minimize casualties from 
confrontations with government forces. Furthermore, Crouch contends that globally the fight against terrorist/insurgent 
groups have often been carried along the following approaches. (1) Amelioration of grievances; (2) Selective government 
repression; (3) Discrediting the insurgent/terrorist actors ideologies; (4) Improving intelligence collection; and (5) The 
restriction of civil liberties, (Crouch, 2010: 17-26). 
 
5.1 Amelioration of Grievances 
 
The amelioration of grievances as an approach for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency is predicated on fact that, 
grievances are usually the main reasons for emergence of insurgent/terrorist groups. For instance, grievances are the 
causal factors that trigger an individual’s sensitivity towards insurgent/terrorist flattery and enticement for action in order 
to change the status quo, (Rojahn, 1998). Explaining the importance of using grievance amelioration approach, the 
former Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans (1998) stated that:  
 
“Where poverty and joblessness do become relevant is in creating a larger class of young men, and increasingly 
women, insecure to the point of hopelessness about their own futures, who become that much more vulnerable to 
recruitment- by those who play upon that insecurity, fire up the sense of political grievance endemic throughout the 
Arab-Islamic world, and, critically, offer a religious justification for jihad: making holy war” (Evans 1998:7). 
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Stubbs (2004) argues that amelioration of grievances approach was employed by the British and Malayan 
Administration under the concept of “hearts and minds” (prevalent introduction of developmental projects, elections, and 
adequate security) to stop the Malayan Races’ Liberation Army (MRLA) from exploiting the rural Chinese-Malayans for 
recruits and supplies. Similarly, Ross and Gurr (1989) contend that the emergence and demise of New Left and Quebec 
terrorism in America and Canada was due to efforts made in addressing the problems which gave birth to the rise of 
terrorism in the first place. In addition, Turkey which has a long history of combating terrorism and insurgency has equally 
employed diplomacy and measures to address the root causes of the act (Ozeren and Cinoglu, 2006). 
 
5.2 Selective Government Repression 
 
Developed in 1960 by Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, scholars of a nonprofit global think tank, Research And 
Development (RAND), selective government repression counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy is a cost-benefit 
approach which is aimed at using systems analysis and econometric skills in order to win the fight against the 
insurgent/terrorist groups (Stubbs, 2004). The use of this approach is associated with some contradictions in terms of 
effects. For instance, Nevin (2003) argues that ‘violent retaliation’ is a counterproductive method of combating terrorism, 
since it ‘adds to the overall sum of human misery for innocent civilians, who happened to be in the way of a retaliatory 
attack, thereby creating potential recruits to the terrorists ’cause,. In the same vein, Rosendorff and Sandler (2004) 
opined that ‘government operations which bomb alleged terrorist assets, hold suspects without charging them, 
assassinate suspected terrorists, curb civil freedoms, or imposed retribution on alleged sponsors may have a downside 
by creating more grievances in reaction to heavy-handed tactics or unintended collateral damage’ –grievances that may 
promote recruitment to the terrorist network.  
The case of  Frente Farabundo Mari para la Liberation Nacional of El Savador insurgents which lasted for the 
period of 12 years resulting in the death of an estimated 75, 000 people, is a typical example of how the use of repression 
can bolster an insurgent group’s recruitment instead of reducing it, (Beckett, 2001). On the contrary, Gillespie (1995) 
contends that the use of selective government repression can suppress the insurgent/terrorist groups from spreading. For 
instance, the Movimiento Peronista Montonero insurgent group was curtailed by the Argentinean military in 1977 using 
the repression approach. In addition, the current use of drones against the global terrorist interests by the Obama 
administration is also in line with the selective repression counterterrorism approach. 
 
5.3 Discrediting the Insurgent/Terrorist Actors Ideologies 
 
The basic principle of this counterinsurgency/counterterrorism approach according to Crouch (2010: 23) is that, people 
are motivated to join an insurgent actor less because of material inducements and/ or physical compulsion, and more 
because of their acceptance of the insurgent actor’s world view about what needs to be done and the necessity of 
violence. Therefore, it is important for government to disabuse the minds of the population from the views of the insurgent 
actor so as to prevent people from joining the group. In his contribution on how to succeed in the fight against terror 
groups in the Southeast Asia, Ramakrishna (2005: 351) argues that:  
 
“…[E]nduring success in the war on terror in the region [Southeast Asia] will not be achieved until and unless the 
ideological basis of the likes of Jemaah Islamiah (JI) is effectively undercut. In other words, only when the global jihadi 
capacity to regenerate by attracting recruits and sympathizers to its cause is severely weakened, and more crucially, its 
cause is regarded by the Southeast Asian Muslim communities as discredited, can one begin to seriously talk about 
success” (Ramakrishna, 2005: 351). 
 
Ideology can be viewed as a set of ideas by which insurgent actors ‘posit, explain, and justify’ their goals and 
methods for ‘organized social action’, (Mullins 1972, and Seliger 1976).  
 
5.4 Improving Intelligence Collection 
 
Despite the fact that there are divergent views regarding the most appropriate counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 
approach, there seem to be general agreement on the need for improving government intelligence gathering 
mechanisms. This is because the ability of a government to cause more damage on the insurgent/terrorist groups 
depends on how it is able to collect, analyze, and disseminate information on the activities of the insurgents and the 
terrorists. Thompson (1966) highlights the importance of intelligence in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 
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campaigns as follows:  
 
“Good intelligence leads to more frequent and more rapid contacts. More contacts lead to more kills. These in turn lead 
to greater confidence in the population, resulting in better intelligence and still more contacts and kills. That, General, is 
why you should first worry about intelligence” (Thompson, 1966).   
 
Likewise, Paget (1967) asserts that ‘Good intelligence is undoubtedly one of the greatest battle-winning factors in 
counterinsurgency warfare’. Short (1975) further stressed the role of good intelligence in counterinsurgency by 
contending that the ‘most important reason’ why the British and Malayan security forces were able to inflict an increasing 
rate of casualties on the Malayan Race Liberation Army (MRLA) was due to the quality of intelligence information coming 
from the public’. Similarly, the French Army was able to apprehend and kill many members of the Front de liberation 
nationale in Algeria as a result of improved intelligence gathering sources, (Horne, 1977; Aexander and Keiger (2002); 
Martin, 2005).  
Presently, the British intelligence and law enforcement agencies involved in counterterrorism have shifted their 
attention from the conventional reactive investigation to proactive intelligence gathering. Thus, according to Cuthbertson 
(2006) in London and other large cities within the UK, the eyes of law enforcement agencies are continuously overseeing 
many public areas. Aided by the information technology devices such as surveillance cameras which are strategically 
planted, the law enforcement agencies are able to monitor public activities in shopping malls, sports arenas, 
entertainment avenues, neighborhoods, major traffic and pedestrian arteries, motorways and service areas, etc. In 
addition, apart from the well known British intelligence service (M15), new intelligence units such as Joint Terrorism 
Analysis Centre (JTAC) and National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) have also been created to strengthen the 
government intelligence gathering capabilities.  Similarly, the US government has restructured its national intelligence 
organization by introducing Department of Homeland Security under a new Director of National Intelligence with the 
responsibility of coordinating the operations of 16 intelligence agencies that are expected to provide information to the 
counterterrorism center, (Shelley, 2006). 
 
5.5 The Restriction of Civil Liberties 
 
The post 9/11 reactions across the globe indicate that many countries have introduced counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency laws aimed at restricting the freedom of civil liberties. Restriction of civil liberties is the enactment and 
enforcement of legislation, specifically designed to combat insurgency or terrorism, (Crouch, 2010). For example, 
Malaysia’s Internal Security Act 1960 empowered the government to arrest suspected terrorist without undergoing due 
process of law (Kamarulnizam Abdullah 2015). In Australia, Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002, 
Australian Security Intelligence Organization Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003, and Anti-Terrorism Act (No. 2) 
2005 have among others empowered the Attorney General to: (i) outlaw specific organizations on the basis that s/he 
believes they pose a threat to national security; (ii) authorized the Australian Security Intelligence Organization to detain 
people for up to seven days for questioning, even if they are not suspected of, or charged with any crime; and (iii) 
introduced ‘preventative detention’ and ‘control’ orders that allow the Australian Federal Police (AFP) to detain or severely 
restrict the freedom of individuals who are suspected of possible involvement in future ‘terrorist’ offence. Similarly, 
immediately after the 9/11 attack, the UK government revised its anti-terrorism law to enable law enforcement agencies to 
detain and without trial non British terror suspects, (Parker, 2004). 
In United States of America, the introduction of National Security Agency domestic surveillance program by the 
Bush administration empowers the agency to monitor some telephone calls without securing the permission to do so as 
provided under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Likewise in developing countries within Asia and Africa 
several anti-terrorism laws have either been established or about to be established. For instance, the Kenyan government 
recently signed into law a new anti-terrorism Act which is being contested in the court by members of civil liberty 
organizations. The major highlights of the Kenyan anti-terrorism law stipulate that police can hold terror suspects from the 
existing 90 days period to nearly a year. In addition, the security agencies can monitor telephone conversations, and the 
courts have the authority to increase jail term for acts of terrorism. The law also provides that journalists can be 
imprisoned for three years on account of publication that undermine investigation or security operations relating to 
terrorism, or publication of images of terror victims without police consent, (www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/).   
Although globally civil society and human right groups have complained against the anti-terrorism laws, the 
government has insisted that “the very mechanisms that protect the individual from state power… also hamper the state’s 
ability to respond to the [terrorist] threat” (Donohue, 2005).  Debunking the government claim on the importance of 
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restricting civil liberties is study conducted by Christopher Hewitt which reveals that violence perpetrated by 
insurgents/terrorists was not reduced despite the implementation of the law in Cyprus, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, 
and Uruguay. On the contrary, Freeman (2003) contends that, such laws ‘can be effective (in terms of reducing the 
number and lethality of terrorist attacks), but their effectiveness is dependent on both the ‘size of the active terrorist group 
in relation to its level of support, and speed with which the security forces capture suspected terrorists’.  
Furthermore, Orttung (2006) explained that despite the public objections to new anti-terror laws, they have largely 
come to terms with them. For instance, the result of Guardian opinion poll reveals that three quarters of UK people are 
willing to surrender their civil liberties so as to ensure the safety of Great Britain, (Freedland, 2005).  However, 
notwithstanding the public acceptance, striking a balance between constitutional rights and the war against terrorism and 
insurgency is a serious dilemma especially for liberal democratic governments.  
 
 African Traditional Institutions and Security Management 6.
 
Traditional institutions in Africa are pre-colonial agencies established through kinship and entrusted with the responsibility 
of ensuring the actualization of peoples political and socio-economic needs base on their cultural norms and values. 
Hence they are often referred to as custodians of traditional norms, practices and values (Nweke 2012, Orji and Olali 
2010, Mohammed 2007, and Crook 2005).  Also known as traditional authorities, traditional leadership or indigenous 
institutions varies according to cultural norms and values. Prominent among them are traditional rulers or chiefs, the 
lineage, extended and nuclear family systems, age grade, professional guilds, administration of justice and court 
historians, court jesters and praise singers (Mohammed 2007). Two basic reasons have been advanced why the heads of 
these institutions are referred to as traditional rulers. The first reason is that, their emergence is based on cultural norms 
and values and secondly, the term is used to distinguish between them and modern system of governance as 
represented by the Westphalia state system.  
Over the years African traditional institutions of leadership have under gone several changes arising from the 
colonialization and de-colonialization of the continent. As a result of this, the concept of traditional institutions now convey 
different thing to different people. For instance, to people like Badejo and Ogunyemi (1989), the institution is a historical 
relic which should be confined to antiquity. Thus, the argument being put forward by the political elites is that, with 
democratic system of governance the institutions have become irrelevant. More importantly, is the point that a strong 
traditional institution is capable of undermining the democratic governance as the two cannot exist together harmoniously. 
However, recent developments across the continent suggest that, despite the attempt to render this institution irrelevant, 
it has continue to survive and even exerting more influence that the contemporary state institutions of governance.  
For example, one of the findings of Carolyn Logan’s research conducted in 19 African countries including Nigeria 
reveals that greater number of the population still favors the existence of the institution. While 50 percent of the 
respondents indicate that the institution still has some relevance within their communities, 58 percent of the respondents 
support the idea of government increasing the roles of the institutions (Logan 2013: 362-364). In addition to Logan’s 
findings,   McIntosh, 1990;  Abacha, 1994; 1999; Englebert, 2002;  Agbese, 2004;  and Mefor, 2012 contend that, 
traditional institutions of leadership play important roles within the African communities as such it cannot be easily 
discarded. Furthermore, they argue that, owing to the inabilities of the contemporary institutions of governance to address 
the problems of majority of the population in many African states, the people are left with no choice than to relay on their 
traditional leaders.  
Likewise, Olaniran and Arigu (2013: 125) opined that “traditional rulers are the closest to the people, and the 
custodians of the tradition of the people, downplaying their roles in governance of any society will amount to chaos. This 
is evident in the recent state of poverty, frequent electoral and post-electoral strife, and most especially persistence of 
widespread ethnic and civil conflicts experienced in Nigeria”. Emphasizing the need for traditional institutions to be 
reintegrated into the modern system of governance in Africa particularly in the quest for security, Mohammed (2007) 
asserts that:  
 
“Today’s largely heterogeneous communities in Nigeria have made the concept of internal security difficult to realize. 
The traditional rulers should be encouraged to monitor activities in their immediate domains. In most communities, 
traditional rulers still have a lot say in the security management of such areas” (Mohammed 2007:12).  
 
Supporting the position of Mohammed (2007), Vaughan (2003) contends that ‘Given the resilience of the 
indigenous political structures and the colossal failure of the Nigerian state, it is essential to re-open the discussion on the 
role of chieftaincy in colonial and post colonial Nigerian politics’, (2003:3). Thus, when it comes to issue of security, this 
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structure can be used for intelligence gathering purpose as observed by Mefor, (2012) that:  
 
“Containing the scourge of the security challenges requires intelligence gathering at the grassroots, and this is where 
nobody in Nigeria is better positioned to track locals who do crime than the traditional ruler. We need to reverse the 
pattern of security from top – bottom to bottom –up approach, where intelligence gathering, peace and amity building 
starts from the grassroots where the traditional rulers and traditions will play a critical role” (Mefor, 2012:2). 
 
Similarly, in his research on how metropolitan Kano is policed, Hils, (2011) states that:  
 
“The Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is able to draw on information from the Emirate system based on resilient Islamic 
institutions and monitoring by hereditary ward and district heads; ward heads, for example, report disturbances and the 
presence of strangers to the 44 district heads responsible for Kano’s territory and administrative departments” (Hills, 
2011: 57-58). 
 
 Hence, it can be argued that traditional institution of leadership such as Kano Emirate Council have a significant 
role in managing terrorism and insurgency. Given the closeness of traditional institutions in the society, the role of 
traditional institution in maintaining law and order cannot be overlooked. As an officer from one of the Nigerian security 
agencies, who refused to be identified, argued that:  
 
“Custodians of tradition and customs traditional institutions enjoy respect and loyalty from members of their 
communities. This is why they have always been called upon to intervene in resolving conflicts that can lead to serious 
security problems in the community” (Interview Respondent, 1). 
 
 Furthermore, a Nigerian officer from the State Security Service (SSS), who was also refused to be identified due 
to security reasons, explained that, traditional institutions such as Kano Emirate Council can be effectively used for 
intelligence gathering provided the present administrative structure is reorganized. According to him:  
 
“At the moment, the administrative structure of Kano Emirate Council is rigid in terms of security purpose. The structure 
should be reorganized to make it possible for ward heads to boycott the existing protocol of hierarchal reporting and 
communicate intelligence information directly to the relevant security agency. A situation where the ward head will have 
to pass security information to the village head, who will in turn communicate to the district head, and the district head to 
the emir before it gets to the security agencies means that the information can be compromised along the way” 
(Interview Respondent, 2). 
 
On the role of Kano Emirate Council towards managing terrorism and insurgency in the state, a senior military 
commander currently engaged in the fight against Boko Haram insurgents contends that:   
 
“At the moment the Emirate Council is collaborating with contemporary security agencies in the area of intelligence 
gathering. However, to achieve a synergy between the two institutions, members of the traditional institution need to be 
empowered and motivated especially the ward heads who perform the roles of watch dogs to the communities. Once 
this is done, all the problems of insurgency would be drastically reduced. This is because most of the Improvised 
Explosive Devices (IEDS) being used by the Boko Haram insurgents are prepared within the communities. This means 
that some of the Boko Haram members are living within the communities” (Interview Respondent, 3). 
 
Apart from using the administrative structure of Kano Emirate Council intelligence gathering, another finding of the 
study indicates that, the institution can also be useful for managing terrorism and insurgency through discrediting their 
ideological foundations. For example, the strong opposition demonstrated against the Boko Haram insurgent group which 
claims to be fighting for the establishment of Islamic Sharia laws in Northern Nigeria by the Kano Emirate through the 
religious leaders within the communities whose first loyalty and respect goes to the Emirate Council, has helped in 
discrediting their ideological believes in the minds of the people. A respondent from the Emirate Council summarized the 
role of the institution when Boko Haram insurgents attacked Kano in 2012 as follows:  
 
“It is on record that the late Emir Alhaji Ado Bayero was attacked by the insurgents and almost lost his life because of 
his open opposition to the group’s activities. First by directing all the ward heads under the emirate council across the 
state to ensure that, identities of new comers into their communities are properly ascertained before they are allowed to 
settle. In this regards, all local and registered property agents as well as individuals were directed to scrutinize the 
identities of immigrants especially refuges from the neighboring states before accommodating them. This helped in 
preventing the settlement of Boko Haram insurgents coming from Borno state among the communities” (Respondent, 
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 The hard-line position taken by the Emir was viewed by the insurgents as an attempt to deny them shelter hence 
they decreed that members of the Emirate Council should be killed. Thus, recently, when the new Emir, Muhammad 
Sanusi II directed that people should defend themselves against the insurgents, a similar attack targeting him was 
launched in the central mosque of the Emirate Council during Friday prayers killing hundreds of worshipers. Underscoring 
the implication of Boko Haram’s attacks on the late emir Ado Bayero and the present emir Muhammad Sanusi II, a 
respondent explained that, Boko Haram insurgent group understands that people have more regards on the emir’s 
instructions than that of government officials hence the emirs are being attacked.  
 
 Conclusion  7.
 
This article argues that the African traditional institutions like Kano Emirate Council of Nigeria have a significant role to 
play in societal security. For example, the role of the Kano Emirate Council in the current fight by Nigeria’s security forces 
against Boko Haram insurgents has been acknowledged by members of the security agencies and the general public. 
Thus, it is now abundantly clear that the fight on terrorism and insurgency which requires collective approach will be 
better managed if key institutions like the African traditional leadership are carried along. This is because experience has 
shown that even United States of America with all its military might had to involve community or tribal leaders in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, and now Syria in the fight against terrorism and insurgency. Furthermore, the need to 
involve traditional institutions in managing terrorism and insurgency within the African societal settings is necessitated 
lack of adequate modern surveillance technologies such as close circuit cameras as obtained in many developed 
countries such as the Britain that can help in monitoring the activities of the people in the communities.  
Consequently, it is the position of the article that, the difficulties faced by security agencies in overcoming Boko 
Haram insurgents and other security challenges in Nigeria, makes it imperative to re-examine the idea of the formal 
reintegration of traditional institutions with the contemporary security agencies.  Doing so will enable the two institutions 
achieve a synergy that will facilitate effective management of security problems especially those relating to terrorism and 
insurgency. In this regard, creating a modality such as the restructuring of the traditional institutions administrative to 
allow the ward heads communicate intelligence information to contemporary security agencies directly without adhering 
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